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Abstract
Because of their interesting algebraic properties, several authors promote the use of general-
ized Reed-Solomon codes in cryptography. Niederreiter was the first to suggest an instantiation
of his cryptosystem with them but Sidelnikov and Shestakov showed that this choice is insecure.
Wieschebrink proposed a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem which consists in concatenating a
few random columns to a generator matrix of a secretly chosen generalized Reed-Solomon code.
More recently, new schemes appeared which are the homomorphic encryption scheme proposed
by Bogdanov and Lee, and a variation of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed by Baldi et al.
which hides the generalized Reed-Solomon code by means of matrices of very low rank.
In this work, we show how to mount key-recovery attacks against these public-key encryption
schemes. We use the concept of distinguisher which aims at detecting a behavior different from
the one that one would expect from a random code. All the distinguishers we have built are
based on the notion of component-wise product of codes. It results in a powerful tool that is able
to recover the secret structure of codes when they are derived from generalized Reed-Solomon
codes. Lastly, we give an alternative to Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack by building a filtration
which enables to completely recover the support and the non-zero scalars defining the secret
generalized Reed-Solomon code.
Keywords. Code-based cryptography; generalized Reed-Solomon codes; key-recovery; distin-
guisher; homomorphic encryption.
Mathematics Subject Classication (2010): 11T71, 94B40
Introduction
The first cryptographic scheme using generalized Reed-Solomon codes was proposed in 1986 by
Niederreiter [Nie86] but it was shown to be insecure in [SS92]. The attack recovers the underlying
Reed-Solomon code allowing the decoding of any encrypted data. However during the past years
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there were several attempts to repair this scheme. In the present article, we focus on three modified
McEliece schemes using generalized Reed Solomon codes. The first one was proposed by Wiesche-
brink [Wie06] and consists in choosing a generator matrix of a generalized Reed-Solomon code and
adding to it a few random columns. It was advocated that this modification avoids the Sidelnikov-
Shestakov attack [SS92]. More recently, some of the nice algebraic properties of the Reed-Solomon
codes were also used to devise the first public-key homomorphic encryption scheme [BL11] based
on coding theory. The third one is another variant of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] proposed
in [BBC+11] which uses this time a generator matrix of a generalized Reed-Solomon but hides its
structure differently than in the McEliece cryptosystem: instead of multiplying by a permutation
matrix, the generator matrix is multiplied by a matrix whose inverse is of the form Π+R where Π
is a sparse matrix with row density m > 1 and R is a matrix of rank z > 1. The key point of this
modification is that the public code obtained with this method is not anymore a generalized Reed-
Solomon code and this seems to thwart the Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack completely. In the
present article, we propose polynomial time attacks of these three schemes. Notice that for Baldi
et al.’s scheme [BBC+11], our attack only considers the case when the matrix Π is a permutation
matrix i.e. the case m = 1, and R is of rank z = 1. We focus on these specific cases because all
the parameters proposed in [BBC+11] were of this form. A good reason for these choices (m = 1
and z = 1) stems from the fact that the resulting schemes have the smallest public key sizes and
the smallest deciphering complexity among this class of encryption schemes.
Contrarily to the Niederreiter’s proposal [Nie86] based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes, the
original McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] which uses Goppa codes, has withstood many key-recovery
attacks and after more than thirty years now, it still belongs to the very few unbroken public-key
cryptosystems. No significant breakthrough has been observed with respect to the problem of
recovering the private key. For instance, the weak keys found in [Gib91, LS01] can be easily avoided.
This fact has led to claim that the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code does not disclose any
visible structure that an attacker could exploit. This is strengthened by the fact that Goppa codes
share many characteristics with random codes. However, in [FGO+11, FGUO+13], an algorithm
that manages to distinguish between a random code and a Goppa code has been introduced. This
work, without undermining the security of [McE78], prompts to wonder whether it would be possible
to devise an attack based on such a distinguisher. It turns out [MCP12] that the distinguisher
in [FGO+11, FGUO+13] has an equivalent but simpler description in terms of the component-
wise product of codes. This notion was first put forward in coding theory to unify many different
algebraic decoding algorithms [Pel92, Ko¨t92]. Recently, it was used in [MCMMP11a, MCMMP12b]
to study the security of cryptosystems based on Algebraic-Geometric codes. Component-wise
powers of codes are also studied in the context of secure multi-party computation (see for example
[CCCX09, CCX11]). This distinguisher is even more powerful in the case of Reed-Solomon codes
than for Goppa codes. Indeed, whereas for Goppa codes it is only successful for rates close to 1, it
can distinguish Reed-Solomon codes of any rate from random codes.
In the specific case of [BL11], the underlying public code is a modified Reed-Solomon code
obtained from the insertion of a zero submatrix in the Vandermonde generating matrix defining
it and in this case, the aforementioned distinguisher leads to an attack that is different from the
one found independently by Brakerski in [Bra13]. More exactly, we present a key-recovery attack
on the Bogdanov-Lee homomorphic scheme based on the version of our distinguisher presented
in [MCP12]. Our attack runs in polynomial time and is efficient: it only amounts to calculate
the ranks of certain matrices derived from the public key. In [BL11] the columns that define the
zero submatrix are kept secret and form a set L. We give here a distinguisher that detects if
one or several columns belong to L or not. It is constructed by considering the code generated
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by component-wise products of codewords of the public code (the so-called “square code”). This
operation is applied to punctured versions of this square code obtained by picking a subset I of the
whole set indexing the columns. It turns out that the dimension of the punctured square code is
directly related to the cardinality of the intersection of I with L. This gives a way to recover the
full set L allowing the decryption of any ciphertext.
We also propose another cryptanalysis against the variant of the McEliece cryptosystem [McE78]
proposed in [BBC+11]. As explained above, the public code obtained with this method is not
anymore a generalized Reed-Solomon code (GRS for short). On the other hand, it contains a very
large secret GRS code. We present an attack that is based on a distinguisher which is able to
identify elements of this secret code. This distinguisher is again derived from considerations about
the dimension of component-wise products of codes. Once this secret code is obtained, it is then
possible to completely recover the initial GRS code by using the square-code construction as in
[Wie10]. We are then able to decode any ciphertext.
Finally, we also cryptanalyze the first variant of the McEliece cryptosystem based on GRS codes
[Wie06]. We show here how a refinement of our distinguisher permits to recover the random columns
added to the generator matrix of the GRS code. Once these column positions are recovered, the
Sidelnikov and Shestakov attack can be used on the non-random part of the generator matrix to
completely break the scheme. It should also be pointed out that the properties of Reed-Solomon
codes with respect to the (component-wise) product of codes have already been used to cryptanalyze
a McEliece-like scheme [BL05] based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10]. The use of this
product is nevertheless different in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. Note also that our attack
is not an adaptation of the Sidelnikov and Shestakov approach [SS92]. Our approach is completely
new: it illustrates how a distinguisher that detects an abnormal behavior can be used to recover a
private key.
To demonstrate further the power of our approach, we give an alternative to Sidelnikov and
Shestakov’s way [SS92] to fully recover the structure of a generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Our new
attack uses the code product to build a decreasing chain of subcodes resulting to a code of very small
dimension which shares the same support as the original secret generalized Reed-Solomon code and
for which the structure is very simple to recover. This achievement is obtained by repeatedly solving
linear systems. The resulting complexity is O(k2n3+k3n2) operations in the underlying field. This
attack is more complex than the original Sidelnikov and Shestakov but, because it does not rely on
the computation of minimum codewords as in [SS92], it might be applied to other families of codes
such as Reed-Muller codes. This is in particular the case for wild Goppa codes [BLP10] as shown
in the paper [COT14] where this technique was further developed and applied to wild Goppa codes
defined over quadratic extensions. It gave for the first time a polynomial time attack on a McEliece
cryptosystem based on non-binary Goppa codes. This recent result highlights the potential power
of this method in cryptography.
Organization of the paper. In Section 1 we recall relevant notions from coding theory. In
Section 2, we show that adjunction of random columns to a generalized Reed-Solomon codes as
advocated in [Wie06] does not improve the security of McEliece-like cryptosystems based on Reed-
Solomon codes. In Section 3 we describe the cryptanalysis of the homomorphic cryptosystem
introduced by Bogdanov and Lee in [BL11]. Section 4 describes the cryptosystem proposed in
[BBC+11] and explains the reasons why this scheme is insecure. In Section 5 we give another way
to attack a scheme based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes, and lastly we conclude the paper.
3
1 Reed-Solomon Codes and the Square Code Construction
We recall in this section a few relevant results and definitions from coding theory and bring in the
fundamental notion which is used in both attacks, namely the square code construction. Generalized
Reed-Solomon codes (GRS in short) form a special case of codes with a very powerful low complexity
decoding algorithm. It will be convenient to use the definition of these codes as evaluation codes.
Definition 1 (Generalized Reed-Solomon code). Let k and n be integers such that 1 6 k < n 6
q where q is a power of a prime number. The generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk(x,y) of
dimension k is associated to a pair (x,y) ∈ Fnq × F
n
q where x is an n-tuple of distinct elements of
Fq and y an n–tuple of arbitrary nonzero elements in Fq. The code GRSk(x,y) is defined as:
GRSk(x,y)
def
=
{
(y1p(x1), . . . , ynp(xn)) : p ∈ Fq[X],deg p < k
}
.
Remark 1. Reed-Solomon codes correspond to the case where yi = 1 for all i.
The first work that suggested to use GRS codes in a public-key cryptosystem scheme was
[Nie86]. But Sidelnikov and Shestakov discovered in [SS92] that this scheme is insecure. They
namely showed that for any GRS code it is possible to recover in polynomial time a couple (x,y)
which defines it. This is all that is needed to decode efficiently such codes and is therefore enough
to break the Niederreiter cryptosystem suggested in [Nie86] or any McEliece type cryptosystem
[McE78] that uses GRS codes instead of binary Goppa codes.
Definition 2 (Componentwise products). Given two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈
F
n
q , we denote by a ⋆ b the componentwise product
a ⋆ b
def
= (a1b1, . . . , anbn)
The star product should be distinguished from a more useful operation in coding theory, namely
the canonical inner product:
Notation 1. Given a, b ∈ Fnq , the inner product a · b is defined as
a · b
def
=
n∑
i=1
aibi.
Definition 3 (Product of codes & square code). Let A and B be two codes of length n. The star
product code denoted by A ⋆B of A and B is the vector space spanned by all products a ⋆ b where
a and b range over A and B respectively. When B = A then A ⋆ A is called the square code of
A and is rather denoted by A 2.
It is clear that A ⋆B is also generated by the ai ⋆ bj ’s where the ai’s and the bj’s form a basis
of A and B respectively. Therefore, we have the following result.
Proposition 4. Let A and B be two codes of length n, then
1. dim(A ⋆ B) 6 dim(A ) dim(B);
2. dim(A 2) 6
(
dim(A ) + 1
2
)
.
Proposition 5. Let A ⊂ Fnq be a code of dimension k. The complexity of the computation of a
basis of A 2 is O(k2n2) operations in Fq.
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Proof. The computation, consists first in the computation of
(k+1
2
)
generators of A 2. This com-
putation costs O(k2n) operations. Then, we have to apply a Gaussian elimination to a
(
k+1
2
)
× n
matrix, which costs O(k2n2) operations. This second step is dominant, which yields the result.
The importance of the square code construction will become clear when we compare the dimen-
sions of square codes obtained through a structured code and random code and one major question
is to know what one should expect. The following Proposition 6 shows that when applied to GRS
codes, the dimension of the square code is roughly twice as large as the dimension of the underlying
code. This fact has been already observed in [Wie10] in a cryptanalytic setting. A proof can also
be found in [MCMMP12a, Proposition 10].
Proposition 6. For k 6 (n+ 1)/2, we have GRSk(x,y)
2 = GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y).
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of a GRS code as an evaluation code since
the star product of two elements c = (y1p(x1), . . . , ynp(xn)) and c
′ = (y1q(x1), . . . , ynq(xn)) of
GRSk(x,y) where p and q are two polynomials of degree at most k − 1 is of the form
c ⋆ c′ =
(
y21p(x1)q(x1), . . . , y
2
np(xn)q(xn)
)
=
(
y21r(x1), . . . , y
2
nr(xn)
)
where r is a polynomial of degree6 2k−2. Conversely, any element of the form
(
y21r(x1), . . . , y
2
nr(xn)
)
where r is a polynomial of degree less than or equal to 2k−2 is a linear combination of star products
of two elements of GRSk(x,y).
This proposition shows that the square code is only of dimension 2k− 1 when 2k− 1 6 n. This
property can also be used in the case 2k−1 > n. To see this, consider the dual of the Reed-Solomon
code, which is itself a Reed-Solomon code [MS86, Theorem 4, p.304]
Proposition 7. GRSk(x,y)
⊥ = GRSn−k(x,y
′) where the length of GRSk(x,y) is n and y
′ is a
certain element of Fnq depending only on x and y.
This result is clearly different from what would be obtained if random linear codes were taken.
Indeed, we expect that the square code when applied to a random linear code of dimension k should
be a code of dimension of order min
{(k+1
2
)
, n
}
. Actually it can be shown by the proof technique
of [FGO+11, FGUO+13] the following result (see also [MCP12]).
Proposition 8 ([FGO+11, FGUO+13]). Let k and n be non-negative integers such that k = O(n1/2)
and consider a random (n−k)× (n−k) matrix R where each entry is independently and uniformly
drawn from Fq. Let R be the linear code defined by the generator matrix (ℑk | R) where ℑk is the
k × k identity matrix.
For any ε such that 0 < ε < 1 and any α > 0, we have as k tends to +∞:
Prob
(
dim
(
R
2
)
6
(
k + 1
2
)(
1− αk−ε
))
= ◦(1)
Therefore GRSk(x,y) can be distinguished from a random linear code of the same dimension
by computing the dimension of the associated square codes. This phenomenon was already observed
in [FGO+11, FGUO+13] for q-ary alternant codes (in particular Goppa codes) at very high rates.
Let us note that even when 2k − 1 > n it is still possible to distinguish GRS codes from random
codes by focusing on
(
GRSk(x,y)
⊥
)2
. We have in this case:
(
GRSk(x,y)
⊥
)2
= GRSn−k(x,y
′)2 = GRS2n−2k−1(x,y
′ ⋆ y′)C 2
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which is a code of dimension 2n− 2k − 1.
The star product of codes has been used for the first time by Wieschebrink to cryptanalyze a
McEliece-like scheme [BL05] based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10]. The use of the star
product is nevertheless different in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. In Wieschebrink’s paper, the
star product is used to identify for a certain subcode C of a GRS code GRSk(x,y) a possible pair
(x,y). This is achieved by computing C 2 which turns out to beGRSk(x,y)
2 = GRS2k−1(x,y⋆y).
The Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm is then used on C 2 to recover a possible (x,y ⋆ y) pair to
describe C 2 as a GRS code, and hence, a pair (x,y) is deduced for which C ⊂ GRSk(x,y).
2 Wieschebrink’s Encryption Scheme
In [Wie06] Wieschebrink suggests a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem based on GRS codes
whose purpose was to resist to the Sidelnikov–Shestakov attack. The idea of this proposal is to use
the generator matrix of a GRS code over Fq in which a small number of randomly chosen columns
are inserted. More precisely, let G be a generator matrix of a GRS code of length n and dimension
k defined over Fq. Let C1, . . . , Cr be r column vectors in F
k
q drawn uniformly at random and let G
′
be the matrix obtained by concatenating G and the columns C1, . . . , Cr. Choose S to be a k × k
random invertible matrix and let Q be a an (n+ r)× (n+ r) permutation matrix. The public key
of the scheme is
Gpub
def
= S−1G′Q−1.
This cryptosystem can be cryptanalyzed if a description of the GRS code can be recovered from
Gpub. We give here a way to break this scheme in polynomial time which relies on two ingredients.
The first one is given by
Lemma 9. Let G′ be a k× (n+ r)–matrix obtained by inserting r random columns in a generator
matrix of an [n, k] GRS code C . Let C ′ be the corresponding code. Assume that k < (n − r)/2,
then
2k − 1 6 dimC ′2 6 2k − 1 + r.
Proof. The first inequality comes from the fact that puncturing C ′2 at the r positions corresponding
to the added random columns yields the code C 2 which is the square of an [n, k] GRS code and
hence an [n, 2k−1] GRS code. To prove the upper bound, let D be the code with generator matrix
D obtained from G′ by replacing the Ci’s columns by all-zero columns and let D
′ be the code
with generator matrix D′ obtained by replacing in G′ all columns which are not the Ci’s by zero
columns. Since G′ =D +D′ we have
C
′ ⊂ D +D ′. (1)
Therefore
C
′2 ⊂
(
D + D ′
)2
⊂ D2 + D ′2 + D ⋆ D ′
⊂ D2 + D ′2
where the last inclusion comes from the fact that D ⋆D ′ is the zero subspace since D and D ′ have
disjoint supports. The right-hand side inequality follows immediately from this, since dimD2 =
2k − 1 and dimD ′2 6 r.
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Remark 2. Actually the right-hand inequality of Lemma 9 is sharp and we have observed experi-
mentally that if 2k − r − 1 < n then, we almost always get
dimC ′2 = 2k − 1 + r. (2)
For instance with values for q, n and r like those proposed in [Wie06] and choosing k = (n−r)/2−1
we observed with 1000 random instances that Equation (2) was always satisfied.
This will be useful to detect the positions which correspond to the Ci’s. We call such positions
the random positions whereas the other positions are referred to as the GRS positions. We use in
this case a shortening trick which relies upon the following well-known lemma.
Lemma 10 ([HP03]). Shortening a GRS code of parameters [n, k] in ℓ 6 k positions gives a GRS
code with parameters [n− ℓ, k − ℓ].
An attack easily follows from these facts. First of all, let us consider the case when 2k−1+r 6 n,
then consider C ′i which is the punctured C
′ code at position i. Two cases can occur:
• i belongs to the random positions, then we expect that the dimension of C ′2i is given by
dimC ′2i = 2k − 2 + r.
since C ′i is a GRS code of dimension k with r − 1 random columns inserted in its generator
matrix hence dimC ′2i = dimC
′2 + r − 1 = 2k − 2 + r with a high probability.
• i belongs to the GRS positions, then C ′i is a GRS code of dimension k with r random columns
inserted in its generator matrix so that
dimC ′2i = 2k − 1 + r.
This gives a straightforward way to distinguish between the random positions and the GRS posi-
tions.
Consider now the case where 2k − 1 + r > n. The point is to shorten C ′ in a positions, then,
thanks to Lemma 10, the same principle can be applied. Here a is chosen such that a < k and
2(k − a) − 1 + r < n − a so that a > 2k − 1 + r − n. Notice that these conditions on a can be
met as soon as k > 2k + r − n that is to say n > k + r, which always holds true. Among these
a positions, a0 of them are random positions and a1
def
= a − a0 are GRS positions. This yields an
a0–codimensional subcode of a GRS code of parameters [n − a1, k − a1] to which r − a0 random
positions have been added (or more precisely this yields a code with generator matrix given by the
generator matrix of an a0–codimensional subcode of a GRS code of size (k − a1) × (n − a1) with
r − a0 random columns added to it). Let Ia be a set of a positions and denote by C
′
Ia
the code C ′
shortened in these positions. Using the previous results, we get that with high probability,
dimC ′Ia
2
= 2(k − a1)− 1 + r − a0
By this manner we get the value of 2a1+ a0 and since a = a1+ a0 is already known we can deduce
the values of a0 and a1. To identify which positions of C
′
Ia
are random positions and which ones
are GRS positions we just use the previous approach by shortening C ′Ia in an additional position
and checking whether or not the dimension decreases by one or two. This approach has been
implemented in Magma and leads to identify easily all the random columns for the parameters
suggested in [Wie06]. After identifying the random columns in the public generator matrix, it
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q n k r Time (in seconds)
128 128 79 20 9.22
256 256 169 39 103.84
512 384 245 64 517.78
512 512 335 83 1517.98
Table 1: Average running time of the attack against Wieschebrink encryption scheme [Wie06] with
N = 100 trials.
just remains to puncture the public code at these positions and to apply the Sidelnikov-Shestakov
attack to completely break the scheme proposed in [Wie06]. The complexity of guessing the random
columns in the public generator matrix is hence given by the complexity of computing the rank of
n + r matrices of size
(
k+1
2
)
× (n + r − 1), that is to say O
(
(n+ r)k2(n+ r)2
)
= O
(
k2(n+ r)3
)
operations in the field Fq.
If, moreover, we assume that 2k − 1 + r > n as it is the case in [Wie06] then in a worst-case
scenario we would guess only one position among the random ones so that we have to iterate at
most r times the previous procedure. The complexity of the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [SS92]
is O
(
k3 + k2n
)
and is negligible compared to the other calculations. Thus, the complexity of the
attack is O
(
k2r(n+ r)3
)
operations in the field Fq. In Table 1 we gathered the running times of
the attack implemented in Magma (V2.19-9) [BCP97] and obtained with an IntelR© Xeon 2.90GHz.
3 Bogdanov-Lee Homomorphic Cryptosystem
3.1 Description of the scheme
The cryptosystem proposed by Bogdanov and Lee in [BL11] is a public-key homomorphic encryption
scheme based on linear codes. It encrypts a plaintext m from Fq into a ciphertext c that belongs
to Fnq where n is a given integer satisfying n < q. The key generation requires two non-negative
integers ℓ, k such that 3ℓ < n and ℓ < k together with a subset L ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality 3ℓ. A
set of n distinct elements x1, . . . , xn from F
×
q are generated at random. They serve to construct a
k × n matrix G whose i-th column GTi (1 6 i 6 n) is defined by
GTi
def
=


(xi, x
2
i , . . . , x
ℓ
i , 0, . . . , 0) if i ∈ L
(xi, x
2
i , . . . , x
ℓ
i , x
ℓ+1
i , . . . , x
k
i ) if i /∈ L
,
where the symbol T stands for the transpose.The cryptosystem is defined as follows:
1. Secret key. (L,G).
2. Public key. P
def
= SG where S is a k × k random invertible matrix over Fq.
3. Encryption. The ciphertext c ∈ Fnq corresponding tom ∈ Fq is obtained as c
def
= xP+m1+e
where 1 ∈ Fnq is the all-ones row vector, x is picked uniformly at random in F
k
q and e in F
n
q
by choosing its components according to a certain distribution η˜.
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4. Decryption. Solve the following linear system with unknowns y
def
= (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ F
n
q :
GyT = 0,
∑
i∈L
yi = 1 and yi = 0 for all i /∈ L. (3)
The plaintext is then m =
n∑
i=1
yici.
Let us explain here why the decryption algorithm outputs the correct plaintext when ℓ and n
are chosen such that the entry ei at position i of the error vector is zero when i ∈ L. If this property
on e holds, notice that the linear system (3) has 3ℓ unknowns and ℓ + 1 equations and since it is
by construction of rank ℓ+ 1, it always admits at least one solution. Then observe that
n∑
i=1
yici = (xP +m1+ e)y
T
= (xP +m1)yT (since ei = 0 if i ∈ L and yi = 0 if i /∈ L)
= xSGyT +m
n∑
i=1
yi
= m (since GyT = 0 and
n∑
i=1
yi = 1).
The decryption algorithm will output the correct plaintext when ℓ and n are chosen such that
the entry ei at position i of the error vector is zero when i ∈ L. The distribution η˜ which is used
to draw at random the coordinates of e is chosen such that this property holds with very large
probability. More precisely, the parameters k, q, ℓ and the noise distribution η˜ are chosen such
that q = Ω
(
2n
α)
, k = Θ
(
n1−α/8
)
, ℓ = Θ
(
nα/4
)
and the noise distribution η˜ is the q-ary symmetric
channel with noise rate1 η = Θ
(
1/n1−α/4
)
where α ∈ [0, 1
4
]. To understand why these parameters
work, we refer to [BL11, §2.3].
3.2 An efficient key-recovery attack
We present here an attack that is different from Brakerski’s one [Bra13]. Ours consists in first
recovering the secret set L and from here, one finds directly a suitable vector y by solving the
system
PyT = 0,
∑
i∈L
yi = 1, yi = 0 for all i /∈ L. (4)
Indeed, requiring that PyT = 0 is equivalent to the equation GyT = 0 since, by definition, P = SG
and since S is invertible. Therefore, (4) is equivalent to the “secret” system (3). An attacker may
therefore recover m without even knowing G just by outputting
∑
i yici for any solution y of (4).
In what follows, we will explain how L can be recovered from P in polynomial time.
Our attack which recovers L relies heavily on the fact that the public matrix may be viewed
as a generator matrix of a code C which is quite close to a generalized Reed-Solomon code (or to
a Reed-Solomon code if a row consisting only of 1’s is added to it). Notice that any punctured
version of the code has also this property (a punctured code consists in keeping only a fixed subset
of positions in a codeword). More precisely, let us introduce
1It means that Prob(ei = 0) = 1− η and Prob(ei = x) =
η
q−1
for any x in Fq different from zero.
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Definition 11. For any I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of cardinality |I|, the restriction of a code A of length n is
the subset of F
|I|
q defined as AI
def
=
{
v ∈ F
|I|
q | ∃a ∈ A ,v = (ai)i∈I
}
.
The results about the unusual dimension of the square of a Reed-Solomon codes which are
given in Section 1 prompt us to study the dimension of the square code C 2 or more generally
the dimension of C 2I . When I contains no positions in L, then CI is nothing but a generalized
Reed-Solomon code and we expect for C 2 a dimension of 2k − 1 when |I| is larger than 2k − 1.
On the other hand, when there are positions in I which also belong to L we expect the dimension
to become bigger and the dimension of C 2 to behave as an increasing function of |I ∩ L|. This is
exactly what happens as shown in the proposition below.
Proposition 12. Let I be a subset of {1, . . . , n} and set J
def
= I ∩ L. If the cardinality of I and J
satisfy |J | 6 ℓ− 1 and |I| − |J | > 2k then
dim(C 2I ) = 2k − 1 + |J | . (5)
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix A. An attacker can exploit this propo-
sition to mount a distinguisher that recognizes whether a given position belongs to the secret set L.
At first a set I which satisfies with high probability the assumptions of Proposition 12 is randomly
chosen. Take for instance |I| = 3k. Then kI
def
= dim(C 2I ) is computed. Next, one element x is
removed from I to get a new set I ′ and kI′ = dim(C
2
I′) is computed. The only two possible cases
are either x /∈ L then kI′ = kI or x ∈ L and then kI′ = kI − 1. By repeating this procedure, the
whole set J = I ∩ L is easily recovered. The next step now is to find all the elements of L that
are not in I. One solution is to exchange one element in I \ J by another element in {1, . . . , n} \ I
and compare the values of kI . If it increases, it means that the new element belongs to L. At the
end of this procedure the set L is totally recovered. This probabilistic algorithm is obviously of
polynomial time complexity and breaks completely the homomorphic scheme suggested in [BL11].
3.3 Inherent weakness of the scheme
The purpose of this section is to explain why the homomorphic scheme of [BL11] leads in a natural
way to define codes whose square code has an abnormal low dimension. This property which seems
inherent to the scheme implies that there is little hope to propose a reparation. This fact was also
observed in [Bra13]. The point of [BL11] is to define a code which is homomorphic for addition
over Fq (all linear codes do the job here) but also protohomorphic for the multiplication over Fq
[BL11, Claim 3.5]. This property holds for their scheme, because there is a solution y of (3) which
satisfies for two ciphertexts c and c′ in Fnq corresponding respectively to the plaintexts m and m
′
in Fq:
y · (c ⋆ c′) = mm′ (6)
Recall that c and c′ are given by
c = xP +m1+ e (7)
c′ = x′P +m′1+ e′ (8)
where e and e′ are error vectors whose support does not intersect L. We also know that y satisfies:
1. GyT = 0;
2.
∑n
i=1 yi = 1;
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3. yi = 0 if i /∈ L with P and G related by a multiplication of an invertible matrix S, i.e.
P = SG.
We deduce from this
y(c ⋆ c′)T = y
(
(xP +m1+ e) ⋆ (x′P +m′1+ e′)
)T
= y
(
P TxT ⋆ P Tx′T + P TxT ⋆ m′1T + P Tx′T ⋆ m1T +m1T ⋆ m′1T
)
+y
(
eT ⋆ (P Tx′T +m′1T + e′T )
)
+ y
(
(P TxT +m1T ) ⋆ e′T
)
The terms y
(
eT ⋆ (P Tx′T +m′1T + e′T )
)
and y
(
(P TxT +m1T ) ⋆ e′T
)
are equal to zero because
the support of y is contained in L and eT ⋆ (P Tx′T + m′1T + e′T ), (P TxT + m1T ) ⋆ e′T have
their support outside L. The terms y(P TxT ⋆ m′1T ) = m′yGTSTxT and y(P Tx′T ⋆ m1T ) =
myGTSTx′T are equal to 0 from Condition (i) on y given above. Therefore in order to ensure (6)
we need that
y
(
P TxT ⋆P Tx′T
)
= 0. (9)
has a non zero solution whose support is contained in L. Let C be the code with generating matrix
P , that is the set of elements of the form xP . Notice that the set of solutions of (9) is precisely
the dual of C 2. This implies that C 2 should not be the whole space Fnq . This is quite unusual as
explained in Section 1 when the dimension k of C satisfies k ≫ n1/2. Furthermore, since we are
interested in solutions of (9) whose support is contained in L we actually need that the dual of C 2L
is non empty which is even more abnormal since CL is a code of length 3ℓ and dimension ℓ. In
other words, the Bogdanov and Lee homomorphic scheme leads in a natural way to choose codes
C which have a non-random behavior with respect to the dimension of the square product.
4 BBCRS Cryptosystem
4.1 Description of the scheme
The cryptosystem denoted by BBCRS proposed by Baldi et al. in [BBC+11] is a variant of the
McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] which replaces the permutation matrix used to hide the secret
generator matrix by one of the form Π+R where Π is a sum of m permutation matrices and R is
a matrix of rank z. Notice that the case m = 1 and z = 0 corresponds to the McEliece cryptosystem
based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes (which was broken in [SS92]). Here we focus on the case
where z = 1, and Π is a single permutation matrix which concerns all the parameters suggested in
Section 5 of [BBC+11]. There is actually a good reason why the case m = 1, z = 1 stands out here:
m = 1 is precisely the case which gives by far the smallest key sizes when the parameters are chosen
so as to avoid generic decoding techniques aiming at recovering the message. Moreover, there is a
big prize coming with increasing the value of z. Basically the deciphering time is proportional to
qzT where q is the size of the field over which the public code is defined (it is typically of the same
order as the length n of the code) and T is the decoding time of the GRS code used in this scheme.
Roughly speaking, deciphering is about nz more complex than in a McEliece cryptosystem based
on GRS codes. It was assumed in [BBC+11] that the gain in the public key size of the scheme
would outweigh the big loss in deciphering time. For this reason it is certainly questionable whether
schemes with z > 2 could be really practical. After the attack, which is detailed in this section,
appeared on www.arXiv.org in [GOT12], a new version of [BBC+11] came out in [BBC+12] where
a slight generalization of Π is considered, namely Π is just sparse now and the actual parameters
proposed in [BBC+12] suggest now matrices Π with a row/column weight between 1 and 2. The
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attack proposed here does not apply directly to these new parameters anymore. It raises the issue
whether a generalization of our attack would be able to break the new parameters, but this is
beyond the scope of this paper.
From the authors’ point of view, the idea underlying these new transformations was they would
allow to use families of codes that were shown insecure in the original McEliece cryptosystem. In
particular, it would become possible to use GRS codes in this new framework. The scheme can be
summarized as follows.
Secret key.
• Gsec is a generator matrix of a GRS code of length n and dimension k over Fq,
• Q
def
= Π+R where Π is an n× n permutation matrix;
• R is a rank-one matrix over Fq such that Q is invertible. In other words there exist
α
def
= (α1, . . . , αn) and β
def
= (β1, . . . , βn) in F
n
q such that R
def
= αTβ.
• S is a k × k random invertible matrix over Fq.
Public key. Gpub
def
= S−1GsecQ
−1.
Encryption. The ciphertext c ∈ Fnq of a plaintext m ∈ F
k
q is obtained by drawing at random e
in Fnq of weight less than or equal to
n−k
2
and computing c
def
= mGpub + e.
Decryption. It consists in performing the three following steps:
1. Guessing the value of eR;
2. Calculating c′
def
= cQ− eR =mS−1Gsec+ eQ− eR =mS
−1Gsec+ eΠ and using the
decoding algorithm of the GRS code to recover mS−1 from the knowledge of c′;
3. Multiplying the result of the decoding by S to recover m.
The first step of the decryption, that is guessing the value eR, boils down to trying q elements
(in the worst case) since eR = eαTβ = γβ where γ is an element of Fq.
4.2 Key-recovery attack when 2k + 2 < n
We define Csec and Cpub to be the codes generated by the matrices Gsec and Gpub respectively.
We denote by n the length of these codes and by k their dimension. We assume in this subsection
that
2k + 2 < n (10)
The case of rates larger than 1/2 will be treated in Subsection 4.3. As explained in Subsection 4.1,
Csec is a GRS code. It will be convenient to bring in the code
C
def
= CsecΠ
−1. (11)
This code C , being a permutation of a GRS code, is itself a GRS code. So there are elements x and
y in Fnq such that C = GRSk(x,y). There is a simple relation between Cpub and C as explained
by Lemma 13 below.
First, notice that, since R has rank 1, then so does RΠ−1. Hence there exist a and b in Fnq
such that:
RΠ−1 = bTa. (12)
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Lemma 13. Let λ
def
= − 1
1+a·bb. For any c in Cpub there exists p in C such that:
c = p+ (p · λ)a. (13)
Proof. Appendix B.
Remark 3. Notice that the definition of λ makes sense if and only of a · b 6= −1. This actually
holds since Q is assumed to be invertible (See Lemmas 24 and 25 in Appendix B).
From now on, we make the assumption that
λ /∈ C⊥ and a /∈ C . (14)
If this is not the case then Cpub = C = GRSk(x,y) and there is a straightforward attack by
applying the Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm [SS92] or the alternative attack we propose in
Section 4. It finds (x′,y′) that expresses Cpub as GRSk(x
′,y′). Our attack relies on identifying
a code of dimension k − 1 that is both a subcode of Cpub and the GRS code C . It consists more
precisely of codewords p+ (p · λ)a with p in C such that p · λ = 0. This particular code which is
denoted by Cλ⊥ is therefore:
Cλ⊥
def
= C∩ < λ >⊥ (15)
where < λ > denotes the vector space spanned by λ. It is a subspace of Cpub of codimension 1 if
Assumption (14) holds. Here is an inclusion diagram for the involved codes.
Cpub
Codim1 ❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
C
Codim1
⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥⑥
⑥
Cλ⊥
(16)
Summary of the attack. Before describing it in depth, let us give the main steps of the attack.
Step 1. Compute a basis of Cλ⊥ using distinguisher-based methods. See § 4.2.1 for further details.
Step 2. Use Wieschebrink’s method [Wie10], which asserts that: C 2
λ⊥
= C 2 to recover the structure
of C 2 and then that of C . See § 4.2.2.
Step 3. Compute a pair (a0,λ0) called a valid pair (Definition 17), which will have similar prop-
erties than the pair (a,λ) (see (12) and Lemma 13 for the definitions of a and λ). See
§ 4.2.3.
Step 4. Thanks to the valid pair, one can decrypt any ciphered message. See § 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Computing a basis of Cλ⊥
The inclusion relations described in the diagram (16) strongly suggest that C 2pub should have an
unusual low dimension since C 2 has dimension 2k − 1 by Proposition 6. More exactly we have the
following result.
Proposition 14. The square code of Cpub satisfies dim
(
C 2pub
)
6 3k − 1.
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Proof. To prove the result, let (b1, . . . , bk−1, bk) be a basis of Cpub, such that (b1, . . . , bk−1) is a
basis of Cλ⊥ . Since Cλ⊥ is a subcode of the GRS code C , which is of dimension k, we have then
dim
(
C 2
λ⊥
)
6 2k − 1, and the vectors bi ⋆ bj with 1 6 i, j 6 k generate C
2
pub. Among these vectors
only bk ⋆bi = bi ⋆bk for 1 6 i 6 k are possibly not in C
2
λ⊥
. Therefore, dim
(
C 2pub
)
6 2k−1+k.
Remark 4. Experimentally it has been observed that the upper-bound is sharp. Indeed, the di-
mension of C 2pub has always been found to be equal to 3k− 1 in all our experiments when choosing
randomly the codes and Q with parameters of [BBC+11] of Example 1 and 2. In our tests we
randomly picked 1000 GRS codes with rate 6 1/2, apply random transformations Q−1 on them.
The second observation is that when a basis g1, . . . ,gk of Cpub is chosen together with l other
random elements z1, . . . ,zl ∈ Cpub, then we may expect that the dimension of the vector space
generated by all products zi ⋆ gj with i in {1, . . . , l} and j in {1, . . . , k} is the dimension of the full
space C 2pub when l > 3. This is indeed the case when l > 4 but it is not true for l = 3 since we have
the following result.
Proposition 15. Let B be the linear space spanned by
{
zi ⋆ gj | 1 6 i 6 3 and 1 6 j 6 k
}
then
it holds:
dim (B) 6 3k − 3.
A proof of this phenomenon is given in Appendix C. Experimentally, it turns out that almost
always this upper-bound is tight and the dimension is generally 3k− 3. But if we assume now that
z1, z2, z3 all belong to Cλ⊥ , which happens with probability
1
q3
since Cλ⊥ is a subspace of Cpub of
codimension 1 (at least when (14) holds), then the vectors zi ⋆gj generate a subspace with a much
smaller dimension.
Proposition 16. If zi is in Cλ⊥ for i in {1, 2, 3} then for all j in {1, . . . , k}:
zi ⋆ gj ⊂ C
2 + < z1 ⋆ a > + < z2 ⋆ a > + < z3 ⋆ a > (17)
and if B is the linear code spanned by
{
zi ⋆ gj | 1 6 i 6 3 and 1 6 j 6 k
}
then
dim (B) 6 2k + 2. (18)
Proof. Assume that the zi’s all belong to Cλ⊥ . For every gj there exists pj in C such that
gj = pj + λ · pja. We obtain now
zi ⋆ gj = zi ⋆ (pj + (λ · pj)a)
= zi ⋆ pj + (λ · pj)zi ⋆ a
∈ C 2+ < z1 ⋆ a > + < z2 ⋆ a > + < z3 ⋆ a > . (19)
This proves the first part of the proposition, the second part follows immediately from the first part
since it implies that the dimension of the vector space generated by the zi ⋆ gj’s is upperbounded
by the sum of the dimension of C 2 (that is 2k − 1) and the dimension of the vector space spanned
by the zi ⋆ a’s (which is at most 3).
The upper-bound given in (18) on the dimension follows immediately from (17). This leads to
Algorithm 1 which computes a basis of Cλ⊥ . It is essential that the condition in (10) holds in order
to distinguish the case when the dimension is less than or equal to 2k + 2 from higher dimensions.
The first phase of the attack, namely finding a suitable triple z1,z2,z3 runs in expected time
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Algorithm 1 Recovering Cλ⊥ .
Input: A basis {g1, . . . ,gk} of Cpub.
Output : A basis L of Cλ⊥ .
1: repeat
2: for 1 6 i 6 3 do
3: Randomly choose zi in Cpub
4: end for
5: B ← <
{
zi ⋆ gj | 1 6 i 6 3 and 1 6 j 6 k
}
>
6: until dim(B) 6 2k + 2 and dim (< z1,z2,z3 >) = 3
7: L ← {z1,z2,z3}
8: s← 4
9: while s 6 k − 1 do
10: repeat
11: Randomly choose zs in Cpub
12: T ← <
{
zi ⋆ gj | i ∈ {1, 2, s} and 1 6 j 6 k
}
>
13: until dim(T ) 6 2k + 2 and dim (< L ∪ {zs} >) = s
14: L ← L∪ {zs}
15: s← s+ 1
16: end while
17: return L;
O
(
q3k2n
)
because each test in the repeat loop 1 has a chance of 1
q3
to succeed. Indeed, Cλ⊥ is
of codimension 1 in Cpub and therefore a fraction
1
q of elements of Cpub belongs to Cλ⊥ . Once
z1,z2,z3 are found, getting any other element of Cλ⊥ is easy. Indeed, take a random element
z ∈ Cpub and use the same test to check whether the triple z1,z2,z is in Cλ⊥ . Since z1,z2 ∈ Cλ⊥
the probability of success is 1q and hence z can be found in O(q) tests. The whole algorithm runs
in expected time O
(
q3k2n
)
+ O
(
qk3n
)
= O
(
q3k2n
)
since k < n 6 q, hence the first phase of the
attack is dominant in the complexity.
4.2.2 Recovering the structure of C
Once Cλ⊥ is recovered, it still remains to recover the secret code and a. The problem at hand can
be formulated like this: we know a very large subcode, namely Cλ⊥ , of a GRS code that we want
to recover. This is exactly the problem which was solved in [Wie10]. In our case this amounts to
compute C 2
λ⊥
which turns out to be equal to GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y) (see [MCMMP11b, MCMMP12a]
for more details). It suffices to use the Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm [SS92] or the algorithm
described in Section 5 to compute a pair (x,y ⋆ y) describing C 2
λ⊥
as a GRS code. From this, we
deduce a pair (x,y) defining the secret code C as a GRS code.
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4.2.3 Deriving a and λ from C and Cλ⊥
At this step of the attack let us summarize what has been done. We have been able to compute
the codes C and Cλ⊥ defined in (11) and (15) respectively. We recall the inclusion diagram.
Cpub + C
Codim1
tt
tt
tt
tt
t
Codim1
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
Cpub
Codim1 ❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏
C
Codim1
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
Cλ⊥
In addition, we know that the code C and Cpub are related by the map
ψa,λ :
{
C → Cpub
p 7→ p+ (p · λ)a
. (20)
To finish the attack, we need to find a pair (a0,λ0) ∈ F
n
q ×F
n
q such that the map ψa0,λ0 induces
an isomorphism from C to Cpub. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 17. A pair (a0,λ0) ∈ F
n
q × F
n
q is said to be a valid pair if
(a) a0 · λ0 6= −1;
(b) ψa0,λ0(C ) ⊆ Cpub.
Remark 5. From Corollary 26 (Appendix B), Condition (a) asserts that ψa0,λ0 is an isomorphism.
Thus,
∀p ∈ Cpub, ∃p
′ ∈ C , such that p = p′ + (p′ · λ0)a0.
Moreover, if (a) holds then the inclusion in (b) is an equality since both codes have the same
dimension.
First, we choose u ∈ C \ Cλ⊥ and v ∈ Cpub \ Cλ⊥ . Since Cλ⊥ has codimension 1 in C , we have
C = Cλ⊥⊕ < u > and Cpub = Cλ⊥⊕ < v > . (21)
A valid pair (a0,λ0) can be found easily using the two following elementary lemmas.
Lemma 18. For all λ0 ∈ C
⊥
λ⊥
\ (C⊥ ∪ C⊥pub), we have
λ0 · u 6= 0 and λ0 · v 6= 0.
Proof. Assume that λ0 · u = 0. Then, λ0 ∈ C
⊥
λ⊥
∩ < u >⊥= (Cλ⊥+ < u >)
⊥. Hence, from (21),
we would have λ0 ∈ C
⊥ which yields a contradiction. The other non-equality is proved by the very
same manner.
Lemma 19. For all λ0 ∈ C
⊥
λ⊥
and for all x ∈ Fnq , we have
ψλ0,x(C ) ⊂ Cpub ⇐⇒ ψλ0,x(u) ∈ Cpub.
Proof. Since u ∈ C , the implication (=⇒) is obvious. Conversely, assume that ψλ0,x(u) ∈ Cpub.
Then, from (21), to show the result there remains to show that ψλ0,x(Cλ⊥) ⊂ Cpub. But, since
λ0 ∈ C
⊥
λ⊥
, then for all p ∈ Cλ⊥ , we have
ψλ0,x(p) = p+ (λ0 · p)x = p.
Thus, ψλ0,x(Cλ⊥) = Cλ⊥ ⊂ Cpub.
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Procedure to recover a valid pair. Before starting, recall that we fixed vectors u ∈ C \ Cλ⊥
and v ∈ Cpub \ Cλ⊥ so that (21) holds.
Step 1. Choose λ0 ∈ C
⊥
λ⊥
\ (C⊥ ∪ C⊥pub) at random. Notice that the set C
⊥
λ⊥
\ (C⊥ ∪ C⊥pub) is
nonempty since both C⊥ and C⊥pub have codimension 1 in C
⊥
λ⊥
and even over a finite field,
no vector space of dimension > 1 is a union of two vector subspaces of codimension 1.
Step 2. Set
a0 :=
1
λ0 · u
(v − u) .
It is well–defined thanks to Lemma 18.
We claim that the pair (a0,λ0) is valid. Indeed, we have
a0 · λ0 =
λ0 · v
λ0 · u
− 1.
Moreover, λ0 · v 6= 0 thanks to Lemma 18, and hence a0 · λ0 6= −1. Thus, the pair satisfies
Condition (a) of Definition 17.
To show that Condition (b) is satisfied too, Lemma 19 asserts that we only need to prove that
ψa0,λ0(u) ∈ Cpub which is true since an elementary computation yields
ψa0,λ0(u) = v
which is in Cpub by construction.
4.2.4 Decryption of any ciphertext
We have found a valid pair (Definition 17) (a0,λ0). We want to decode the vector z
def
= c+e where
e is an error of a certain Hamming weight which can be corrected by the decoding algorithm chosen
for C and c is an element of the public code. From Remark 5 page 16, we know that there exists
p in C such that
c = p+ (λ0 · p)a0. (22)
We compute z(α)
def
= z + αa0 for all elements α in Fq. One of these elements α is equal to −λ0 · p
and we obtain z(α) = p+e in this case. Decoding z(α) in C will reveal p and this gives c by using
Equation (22).
4.3 Extending the attack for rates larger than 1
2
The codes suggested in [BBC+11, §5.1.1,§5.1.2] are all of rate significantly larger than 1
2
, for instance
Example 1 p.15 suggests a GRS code of length 306, dimension 232 over F307, whereas Example
2. p.15 suggests a GRS code of length 511, dimension 387 over F512. The attack suggested in the
previous subsection only applies to rates smaller than 1
2
. There is a simple way to adapt the previous
attack for this case by considering the dual C⊥pub of the public code. Note that by Proposition 7,
there exists y′ in Fnq for which we have C
⊥ = GRSn−k(x,y
′). Moreover, C⊥pub displays a similar
structure as Cpub.
Lemma 20. For any c from C⊥pub there exists an element p in C
⊥ such that:
c = p+ (p · a)b. (23)
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Proof. The key to Lemma 20 is the fact that, from (32), we have C⊥pub = C
⊥P T . Indeed Cpub =
CP−1 and therefore for any element c of Cpub there exists an element p of C such that c = pP
−1.
Observe now that every element c′ in C⊥pub satisfies
0 = c · c′ = pP−1 · c′.
If we set c′ = p′P T it results p ·p′ = 0, therefore C⊥pub = C
⊥P T . This discussion implies that there
exists an element p′ in C⊥ such that:
c′ = p′P T = p′
(
ℑ+ bTa
)T
= p′ + p′aTb = p′ + (p′ · a)b.
It implies that the whole approach of the previous subsection can be carried out over C⊥pub. It
allows to recover the secret code C⊥ and therefore also C . This attack needs that 2(n−k)+2 < n,
that is 2k > n+2. In summary, there is an attack as soon as k is outside a narrow interval around
n/2 which is [n−2
2
, n+2
2
].
5 McEliece Variants Based on GRS codes
In this section, we will give an alternative attack of [SS92] against any McEliece-like cryptosystem
based on GRS codes. This attack runs in polynomial time and makes possible the recovery of the
structure of any GRS code. From the computational point of view, this attack is less efficient than
that of Sidelnikov and Shestakov because of the cost of the computation of squares or star products
of codes. Indeed, the complexity of the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack is O
(
k3 + k2n
)
whereas our
attack runs in O(k2n3 + k3n2) operations. However, our approach remains of interest since it does
not require as a first step the computation of minimum weight codewords. For this reason, it could
provide interesting generalizations. Indeed, it should be noticed that certain key recovery attacks on
other algebraic codes such as [MS07] on Reed–Muller codes and [FM08] on hyperelliptic algebraic
geometry codes are built in the same spirit as Sidelnikov and Shestakov’s attack [SS92] and in
particular have as a first step, the computation of minimum weight codewords. This computation
is subexponential for Reed–Muller codes and exponential in the genus of the curve for algebraic
geometry codes, which limits the attack [FM08] to codes from curves with very low genus. On
the other hand, our method might be generalized to such codes and provides alternative and more
computationally efficient attacks.
5.1 Context and notation
Let C be a q-ary GRS code C
def
= GRSk(a, b) ⊂ F
n
q . Assume that it has dimension k 6 n/2 (if not,
then one can work with the dual code). First assume that the two first positions, i.e. the two first
entries of a are 0 and 1. Such an assumption makes sense since every GRS code is permutation
equivalent to a code satisfying this condition. This is a consequence of the 3–transitivity of the
action of the projective linear group PGL(2,Fq) on the points of the projective line.
Notation 2. For all i, j such that i > 0, j > 0 and i+j 6 k−1, we denote by C (i, j) the subcode of
C given by the evaluation of polynomials vanishing at 0 (i.e. the first position by assumption) with
multiplicity at least i and at 1 (i.e. the second position) with multiplicity at least j, i.e. multiples
of xi(x− 1)j . For convenience sake, we set C (0, 0)
def
= C .
The main step of our attack is to compute some codes among C (i, j). Notice that these codes
are also GRS codes.
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5.2 Computing some subcodes
Clearly, the computation of a generator matrix of C (0, 1),C (1, 0) and C (1, 1) is straightforward
since it reduces to Gaussian elimination. These codes are nothing but shortenings of C . The main
tool of our attack is the following result.
Theorem 21. Assume that k 6 n/2. For all 1 6 i 6 k − 2 and all j such that i + j 6 k − 2, we
have
C (i+ 1, j) ⋆ C (i− 1, j) = C (i, j)2 and C (i, j + 1) ⋆ C (i, j − 1) = C (i, j)2.
Proof. We prove the first identity, the second is obtained easily by symmetry. For all pair of
nonnegative integers (i, j), set
Vi,j
def
= xi(x− 1)jFq[x]<k−i−j
This space has dimension k − i− j and is related to our GRS codes by
C (i, j) =< b ⋆ P (a) | P ∈ Vi,j >,
where for all P ∈ Fq[x], we denote by P (a) the word P (a)
def
= (P (a1), . . . , P (an)). Clearly, we have:
V 2i,j = x
2i(x− 1)2jFq[x]<2k−2i−2j−1
and it is also readily checked that
Vi−1,j ⋆ Vi+1,j = x
2i(x− 1)2jFq[x]<2k−2i−2j−1.
This yields the result.
From the previous result, as long as C (i, j)2 6= Fnq , which holds for k 6 n/2, given generator
matrices of C (i, j) and C (i− 1, j), one can recover a basis of C (i+ 1, j) by solving a simple linear
system. Indeed, deciding whether an element c ∈ C (i, j) is actually in C (i+ 1, j) reduces to solve:
c ⋆ C (i− 1, j) ⊆ C (i, j)2. (24)
It is worthwhile noting that (24) is not satisfied for a c ∈ C (i, j) that does not belong to C (i+1, j).
Complexity. To solve (24), we first need to compute a row-echelon basis for C (i, j)2. From
Proposition 5, this costs O(k2n2). From this basis, we compute easily a basis for
(
C (i, j)2
)⊥
.
The equations of the linear system (24) have the form h ⋆ d where h ∈ C (i − 1, j) and d ∈
(C (i, j)2)⊥. Thus, solving the system consists in computing all these equations whose number is
(dimC (i− 1, j))(n − dimC (i, j)2). Hence their computation costs O(kn(n− 2k)), then we solve a
linear system which costs O(n2k(n− 2k)), or roughly speaking O(n3k). Therefore, the complexity
of solving (24) is O(k2n2 + k3n). This computation should be iterated k times, which yields
O(k2n3 + k3n2) operations.
5.3 Description of the attack
The attack summarizes as follows. We assume that the dimension of the GRS code is less than
n/2, if not one can apply the attack on its dual.
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Step 1. Compute a basis of C (k − 1, 0), i.e. compute a nonzero vector c of this 1–dimensional
space. The corresponding vector comes from the evaluation of a polynomial of the form
λxk−1 for some λ ∈ F×q . More precisely, we get the vector λ(a
k−1 ⋆ b). Then, compute
a basis of C (k − 2, 1). The corresponding vector c′ is of the form µak−2 ⋆ (a − 1) ⋆ b for
µ ∈ F×q and where 1
def
= (1, . . . , 1).
Step 2. The vectors c and c′ have no zero position but the two first ones. Thus, after puncturing
at the two first positions the quotient c′/c makes sense and corresponds to the evaluation
of the fraction ν(x− 1)/x for some ν ∈ F×q (i.e. is ν(a − 1)/a, which makes sense after a
suitable puncturing).
It is worth noting that compared to the vectors c and c′, the vector c′/c corresponds to
the exact evaluation of ν(x− 1)/x at some elements of Fq \ {0, 1} since the entries of b are
cancelled by the quotient.
Step 3. Up to now, we only made two arbitrary choices by fixing the position of 0 and 1. Because
of the 3–transitivity of PGL(2,Fq), one can make a third arbitrary choice. Thus, without
loss of generality, one can assume that ν = 1. Now, notice that the map x 7→ (x− 1)/x is
a bijection from Fq \ {0, 1} to itself with reciprocal map y 7→ 1/(1 − y).
Thus, by applying the map y 7→ 1/(1 − y) to the entries of the vector c′/c we get the
corresponding positions, i.e. the vector a.
Step 4. Now, comparing the vector c with the vector ak, we get b up to multiplication by an
element α ∈ F×q , which does not matter since GRSk(a, b) = GRSk(a, αb) for α ∈ F
×
q .
Remark 6. Roughly speaking, this attack can be regarded as a “local version” of Sidelnikov and
Shestakov’s attack. Indeed, Sidelnikov and Shestakov’s attack consist in finding two codewords of
minimum weight whose support differ only in two positions. This corresponds to shorten the code
at k− 2 positions and then recover the structure of the code using two codewords of this shortened
code. Here, we shorten only in a single position but consider polynomials vanishing with a high
multiplicity.
Conclusion
In this paper we use directly the fact that the square of codes which are close enough to GRS
codes have an abnormally small dimension. When applied to several public-key encryption schemes
[Nie86, Wie06, BBC+11, BL11], it always results in an efficient key-recovery attack. More precisely,
we show that:
• Computing the dimensions of the square of various subcodes of the public code permits
to detect random columns in the generator matrix of the public code of the Wieschebrink
cryptosystem [Wie06],
• Computing the dimensions of the square of various punctured versions of the public code
in the Bogdanov-Lee cryptosystem [BL11] enables to retrieve the Reed-Solomon part of the
public code,
• In the case of the scheme [BBC+11], it is possible to identify a certain subcode that is both
included in a GRS code and the public code,
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• In the case of a McEliece-like cryptosystem based on a GRS code [Nie86], it enables to get a
full filtration by means of GRS subcodes, so that the structure of the public code as a GRS
code is recovered.
It should be mentioned that the idea of using product codes and a suitable filtration was used re-
cently in [COT14] to cryptanalyze successfully in polynomial time the wild McEliece cryptosystems
proposed in [BLP10] that were defined over a quadratic extension.
Note that the component-wise product of codes which is central to our approach has been applied
recently in [CB13] to attack the McEliece variant based on Reed-Muller codes proposed in [Sid94].
The squares of these codes have also an abnormal dimension in this case. This yields in some cases
a polynomial time attack [CB13] and in general it improves upon the subexponential attack of
[MS07]. It would be interesting to study whether an attack similar to our filtration attack which
was effective against GRS codes could be carried out for Reed-Muller codes to yield a polynomial
time attack on all instances of this cryptosystem. However, the most challenging task would be to
attack the original McEliece cryptosystem with similar tools (at least for a range of parameters)
since duals of Goppa codes also have, in a limited way, square codes with low dimensions.2
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A Proof of Proposition 12
Set a
def
= |I| − |J | and b
def
= |I|. After a suitable permutation of the support and the indexes of the
xj’s, the code CI has a generator matrix of the form


x1 x2 · · · xa xa+1 · · · xb
...
...
...
...
...
xℓ1 x
ℓ
2 · · · x
ℓ
a x
ℓ
a+1 · · · x
ℓ
b
xℓ+11 x
ℓ+1
2 · · · x
ℓ+1
a
...
...
... (0)
xk1 x
k
2 · · · x
k
a


We define the maps
ΦI :
{
Fq[x] → F
b
q
P 7→ (P (x1), . . . , P (xb))
and ΦI\J :
{
Fq[x] → F
b
q
P 7→ (P (x1), . . . , P (xa), 0 . . . , 0)
.
We have the two following obvious lemmas.
Lemma 22. Both maps ΦI and ΦI\J are linear. In addition, their restrictions to the vector space
< x2, . . . , x2k > are injective.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the restriction of ΦI\J is injective. It is an elementary conse-
quence of polynomial interpolation, since a = |I| − |J | is assumed to be be larger than 2k.
Lemma 23. For all P,Q ∈ Fq[x], we have:
ΦI (P ) ⋆ΦI (Q) = ΦI (PQ) (25)
ΦI\J (P ) ⋆ΦI\J (Q) = ΦI\J (PQ) (26)
ΦI (P ) ⋆ΦI\J (Q) = ΦI\J (PQ) (27)
Clearly, we have
CI = ΦI
(
< x, . . . , x
ℓ
>
)
⊕ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+1, . . . , xk >
)
. (28)
Using (25), (26) and (27), we get
C
2
I = ΦI
(
< x, . . . , xℓ >
)2
+ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+1, . . . , xk >
)2
+ ΦI
(
< x, . . . , xℓ >
)
⋆ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+1, . . . , xk >
)
= ΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
+ ΦI\J
(
< x2ℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
+ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , xk+ℓ >
)
= ΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
+ ΦI\J
(
< x2ℓ+2, . . . , x2k > + < xℓ+2, . . . , xk+ℓ >
)
Since, by assumption, ℓ < k, we have
< xℓ+2, . . . , xk+ℓ > + < x2ℓ+2, . . . , x2k > = < xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
Therefore,
C
2
I = ΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
+ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
. (29)
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Lemma 22 entails
dimΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
= 2ℓ− 1, and dimΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
= 2k − ℓ− 1. (30)
To conclude the proof, we need to compute the dimension of the intersection of these spaces. For
this purpose, set
R(x)
def
=
b∏
j=a+1
(x− xj).
An element of ΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
∩ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
is an element of ΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
which vanishes on the |J | = b−a last positions: it is an element of ΦI
(
< x2R(x), . . . , x2ℓ−|J |R(x) >
)
.
Thus,
ΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
∩ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
= ΦI
(
< x2R, . . . , x2ℓ−|J |R >
)
∩ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
= ΦI\J
(
< x2R, . . . , x2ℓ−|J |R >
)
∩ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
= ΦI\J
(
< x2R, . . . , x2ℓ−|J |R > ∩ < xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
.
The last equality is also a consequence of Lemma 22 since the direct image of an intersection by
an injective map is the intersection of the direct images.
Since all the xi’s are nonzero, the polynomials x
ℓ+2 and R are prime to each other, this yields
< x2R, . . . , x2ℓ−|J |R > ∩ < xℓ+2, . . . , x2k > =< xℓ+2R, . . . , x2ℓ−|J |R > .
Therefore,
ΦI
(
< x2, . . . , x2ℓ >
)
∩ ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2, . . . , x2k >
)
= ΦI\J
(
< xℓ+2R(x), . . . , x2ℓ−|J |R(x) >
)
(31)
and this last space has dimension ℓ− |J | − 1. Finally, combining (29), (30) and (31), we get
dimC 2I = (2k − ℓ− 1) + (2ℓ− 1)− (ℓ− |J | − 1) = 2k + |J | − 1.
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B Proof of Lemma 13
Recall thatR has rank 1, then so doesRΠ−1 and there exist a and b in Fnq such thatRΠ
−1 = bTa.
Set
P
def
= ℑ+RΠ−1 = ℑ+ bTa.
We first need the following lemmas
Lemma 24. The matrix Q is invertible if and only if P is.
Proof. We have Q = Π+R = (ℑ+RΠ−1)Π = PΠ, which yields the proof.
Lemma 25. The matrix P is invertible if and only if a · b 6= −1. In addition, if it is invertible,
then
P−1 = ℑ−
1
1 + a · b
bTa.
Proof. First, assume that a · b 6= −1. Then,
P
(
ℑ−
1
1 + a · b
bTa
)
=
(
ℑ+ bTa
)(
ℑ−
1
1 + a · b
bTa
)
= ℑ+
(
1−
1
1 + a · b
)
bTa−
1
1 + a · b
bTabTa
= ℑ+
a · b
1 + a · b
bTa−
a · b
1 + a · b
bTa
= ℑ.
To conclude the “only if” part of the proof, there remains to prove that P is non invertible for
a · b = −1. Assume a · b = −1, then
P 2 = ℑ+ 2bTa+ bTabTa = ℑ+ (2 + a · b)bTa = P .
Thus, in this situation, P is a projection distinct from ℑ and hence is non invertible.
Proof of Lemma 13. Let c be an element of Cpub. Since
Csec = CpubQ = Cpub(Π+R) = Cpub(ℑ+RΠ
−1)Π.
We obtain
C = CsecΠ
−1 = CpubP where P
def
= ℑ+RΠ−1. (32)
Therefore
Cpub = (CsecΠ
−1)P−1 = CP−1.
From this, we obtain that there exists p in C such that c = pP−1. Thus, from Lemma 25 we know
that P−1 = ℑ− 1
1+a·bb
Ta = ℑ+ λTa, which enables to write:
c = p
(
ℑ+ λTa
)
= p+ (λ · p)a.
Corollary 26. Given u,v ∈ Fnq the map p 7→ p + (u · p)v is an automorphism of F
n
q if and only
if u · v 6= −1.
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C Proof of Proposition 15
This follows immediately from the fact that we can express zi in terms of the gj ’s, say
zi =
∑
16j6k
aijgj .
We observe now that there exist three relations between the zi ⋆ gj ’s:
∑
16j6k
a2jz1 ⋆ gj −
∑
16j6k
a1jz2 ⋆ gj = z1 ⋆ z2 − z2 ⋆ z1 = 0 (33)
∑
16j6k
a3jz1 ⋆ gj −
∑
16j6k
a1jz3 ⋆ gj = z1 ⋆ z3 − z3 ⋆ z1 = 0 (34)
∑
16j6k
a3jz2 ⋆ gj −
∑
16j6k
a2jz3 ⋆ gj = z2 ⋆ z3 − z3 ⋆ z2 = 0 (35)
It remains to prove that the three obtained identities relating the zi ⋆ gj’s are independent under
some conditions on the zi’s. Actually, these relations are independent if and only if the zi’s generate
a space of dimension larger than or equal to 2. Indeed, sort the z1 ⋆gj ’s as z1 ⋆g1, . . . ,z1 ⋆gk,z2 ⋆
g1, . . . ,z2 ⋆ gk,z3 ⋆ g1, . . . ,z3 ⋆ gk. Then the system defined by Equations (33) to (35) is defined
by the 3× 3k matrix
A :=

a21 · · · a2k −a11 · · · −a1k 0 · · · 0a31 · · · a3k 0 · · · 0 −a11 · · · −a1k
0 · · · 0 −a31 · · · −a3k a21 · · · a2k

 .
Then, A has rank strictly less than 3 if there exists a vector u = (u1, u2, u3) such that uA = 0
which is equivalent to the system


u1z2 + u2z3 = 0
−u1z1 − u3z3 = 0
−u2z1 + u3z2 = 0
and such a system has a nonzero solution u = (u1, u2, u3) if and only if the zi’s are pairwise collinear
i.e. generate a subspace of dimension lower than or equal to 1.
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